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Abstract: 
 
This study aims to examine how the sensitivity for macroeconomic announcements 
surprises changes for the exchange rate in terms of a crisis. Previous research has 
been biased for U.S announcements and their relation towards emerging market, 
which has shown that U.S announcements affect more than the domestic. It also 
suggests that business cycle and uncertainty affect and increase the reaction for 
announcements. This thesis shift the focus towards a small developed economy, 
Sweden’s relation towards larger countries announcements. By using a new approach 
and divide the examined time line for the 2008 crisis to compare with a benchmark 
that represent a normal reaction structure. I found that Swedish announcements has an 
equal reaction structure in comparison to U.S while is more influential over U.K and 
German announcements. Clear evidence of an increased sensitivity for surprises 
exists, and is as large after a crisis has appeared rather than over the business cycle.  
Most influential macroeconomic announcements that increase in reaction were policy 
rates, retail sales, consumer price index, manufacturing price measure index and GDP, 
which is in line with previous studies. 
_____________________________ 
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I. Introduction 
 
Announcements of macroeconomic statistics are an important part of the economic 
analysis. The announcement provides a receipt of how the economic sentiment stands 
and is widely used as a tool for governments, central banks, business, analysts and 
other parts that is connected to the economic wheel to predict, draw conclusions and 
make decision. 
 
The connection between macroeconomic announcements and the corresponding 
market reaction on asset prices is solely an important role to study. Previous studies 
on this subject, using high frequency data by Ederington & Lee, Cai et al among 
others has shown that unexpected surprises from macroeconomic announcements are 
quickly incorporated in asset prices. This gives support for the efficient market 
hypothesis of no investor or trader can repeatedly earn excess returns from trading on 
announcements. Using daily return has shown lasting affects on assets return (see 
work by Vrugt 2010). 
The business cycle tends to be an important part when interpreting macroeconomic 
announcements. Cai, Joo and Zhang (2009) and McQueen and Roley (1990) among 
others have connected the business cycle to the announcement reaction for return on 
both exchange rates and stocks. Their findings show that market reaction tends to be 
stronger when the economy is in low parts of the business cycle, or called recession. 
 
There has been a bias in previous studies, a bias that can be summarized towards two 
main things. The first is towards U.S announcements, which is not that surprising. 
U.S is the global player that has most influence over global demand and global 
policies. This bias could also be a result of the availability of U.S announcements 
statistics, or rather the unavailability of other countries announcements statistics 
(Vrugt 2010). 
The second main bias is towards emerging markets and their impact from global 
actors (read mostly U.S) announcements, where the case has been to evaluate 
domestic versus foreign announcement affect on the small emerging market countries. 
The results in studies like these (read Cai et al (2009) and Andritzky & Bannister 
(2007)) have been that the emerging market countries are more affected by 
announcements surprises from U.S than from the domestic equivalence. 
 
In contrast to previous studies I will rather take the perspective of a developed small 
open economy with high level of exports but still doesn’t affect the global demand. 
This economy described, or country, is Sweden. This thesis purpose is to examine and 
answer if the sensitivity towards macroeconomic announcements changes with 
condition on an economic crisis. The sensitivity will be measured and answered by 
examining two different data-models, which measures changes in small 
announcements surprises, and regular announcements surprises that market 
participants act from. By including both domestic and foreign announcements I will 
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also be able to determine the relationship between Sweden and other larger countries 
and see if the results exhibit the same reaction structure as previous studies has shown 
for emerging markets towards larger countries. Or if Sweden as a developed country 
is more independent where the macroeconomic announcements have an equal 
influence over the exchange rate as the compared larger countries macroeconomic 
announcements has.  
 
My finding was that U.S and Swedish announcements surprises have the same impact 
on the exchange rates, and that there is an increased sensitivity towards unexpected 
news both over and after the crisis. This increased sensitivity is concentrated to a 
small number of macro announcements. For the impact on GBPSEK, Swedish and 
U.K announcements have almost the same influence in a normal reaction structure, 
while the Swedish announcements tend to increase more in reaction over the crisis.  
In EURSEK only Swedish announcements showed signs of increased sensitivity over 
the crisis and where German announcements had surprisingly small influence. The 
increased sensitivity was concentrated to following announcements: policy rates, 
retail sales, consumer price index, manufacturing price measure index and GDP.  
 
My results contribute and give all parts of the economic wheel new tools for 
interpreting the integration between an economic crisis and macroeconomic 
announcements. Using a new approach by dividing the time-series for a real economic 
crisis and compare with a benchmark reaction structure allows for new insights of 
how market react in a sudden appeared crisis and how market actors interpret the 
economic receipt that the announcement provides during such times. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Section II. Theoretical 
discussion, Section III. Data discussion, Section IV. Methodological approach, 
Section V. Results, Section VI. General discussion, VII. Conclusion, Section VIII. 
References and Section IX Appendix.  
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II. Theoretical discussion 
 
In around 1970 Eugene F. Fama presented his article “Efficient Capital Markets” that 
had a huge influence in economic theory. The financial markets classifies as strong 
efficient, which means that asset prices reflecting all available information, public as 
well as private. The main conclusion is that no one therefore can repeatedly beat the 
market acting on new information. When new information (like macroeconomic 
announcements) becomes available, markets quickly incorporate this into the price 
(Burton & Fama 1970). 
 
Applying the efficient market hypothesis would imply that expectations becomes very 
important. If the announcements were in line with expectations, no significant market 
reaction would come as a result, since it would already be priced. This would mean 
that investors act rational to information. On the other hand, unexpected surprises 
should in the very same way generate a market reaction, assuming market participants 
acting rational and according to the efficient market hypothesis. 
However, literature has found evidence that announcements can generate different 
strong reaction depending on factors such as business cycle, country characteristics 
and type of announcement. For example in studies on emerging markets has shown 
that the reaction is greater for foreign macroeconomic announcements than for 
domestic. The reason for this is that mature market announcements are more reliable 
source of information and the actions can be taken with greater conviction (Andritzky 
& Bannister 2007). 
 
However, Andritzky & Bannister ignored a factor that could impact and explain why 
announcements from mature large countries are greater in their conclusion. That is the 
level of trade between countries. Since many emerging market countries are 
dependent on their trading partners imports and investments, it isn’t surprising that 
macroeconomic announcements from their trading-partner is more important. 
Especially since Andritzky & Bannister (2007) also found evidence of emerging 
markets focus more on forward-looking data and announcements. 
 
Sweden should have similar dependency to larger countries announcements, with 
respect of their exposure towards the global market. According to SCB, Sweden´s 
largest export partners are Germany (10 %), Norway (9,9 %), US (8 %) and on place 
six, UK (6,1 %). I therefore expect to find a greater reaction towards news from 
Germany, US and UK. Just like in emerging markets, however there is a big 
difference worthy pointing out, which might influence the results and separate 
Sweden from emerging markets. Sweden has a strong domestic demand and is more 
independent as a country with working institutions, political environment and more 
efficient market structure, that makes the Swedish economy more predictable, which 
could explain if a more equal affect appears. 
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McQueen and Roley (1990) connected the business cycle with macroeconomic 
announcements and found out that in strong economies positive surprises in real 
economic data tends to decrease stock prices while the opposite appears in weak 
phases. Their conclusion from this was that the expected cash flow doesn’t increase 
from unexpected strong macroeconomic news in strong economies, while same strong 
news in a weak cycle would increase expectations about higher future cash flow and 
economic activity. This implies that macroeconomic announcements are of greater 
interest for returns in lower phases of the business cycle. Bonds have been studied in 
the same way, and despise different characteristics from stocks, Flemming and 
Remolona (1997) found evidence in the same direction. That the strongest reaction 
towards macroeconomic announcements happens when market suffers from a higher 
level of uncertainty and the most important variables was employment, PPI, Policy 
rate and CPI. 
 
However it’s difficult to know exactly where in the business cycle the economy is, 
and test for breakpoints in the data do not explicitly shows the reaction of an 
economic crisis. Therefore by dividing the time-series and using a benchmark to 
compare the normal reaction structure of announcement surprises with conditions for 
an economic crisis, the sensitivity for such economic conditions or events would be 
visual. This method hasn’t been used or tested in the literature before and by doing so 
the new ways of analyzing announcements surprises condition for economic crisis is 
provided.  
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III. Data-discussion 
 
Time period for this essay is selected with consideration for two things, first and 
foremost to fit the purpose of dividing the time series to include both a broad 
benchmark and a large sample for the period after a crisis. In this case crisis is 
referred to the 2008 financial crisis that started in U.S but became a global crisis short 
there after. Secondly the information of announcements and expectations are limited, 
the collection of estimates from analysts that is broad enough to build aggregate and 
reliable market expectations is a relative new phenomenon. Therefore from 1995 to 
2016 is more than enough for a benchmark timeline as well as for a prior, over and 
after a crisis sample. 
 
The exchange rate data consists of daily prices from USDSEK, GBPSEK and 
EURSEK. Daily exchange rate returns are calculated with logarithmic first 
differences that gave me the stationary daily returns. Any missed daily prices over 
this period are treated with interpolation method before calculating the return. 
Currency SEK is in the denominator on every currency pair. This implies that a 
negative return on the exchange rate is a relative strengthening of SEK to the 
compared currency and vice versa if a positive daily return displays. For the estimate 
of the announcement effect this implies for Swedish variable that showing a negative 
coefficient is a relative strengthens of the Swedish krona, and vice versa. For the 
compared currencies, that is in the numerator of the ratio, opposite relationship holds. 
 
There are extensive previous research using both daily returns and high frequency 
data. Erderington and Lee (1993) found evidence from high-frequency data that some 
macroeconomic announcements can generate an increased volatility while a new 
equilibrium is reached within a minute after the information was available. This 
means that any possible trading or acting on surprises is gone within this timeline. 
The increased volatility is remained during the first 15 minutes and continuance 
slightly higher the following hours. 
Analyzing daily returns instead would therefore be a good indication for finding a 
lasting effect. Since the possibility to earn excess profit from the announcements is a 
matter of seconds it could therefore be a call of luck from an act of gamble instead of 
closely analysis of the announcement per se (Flemming and Ramelona 1997). 
 
The gathering of macroeconomic announcements data didn’t only limit the choice of 
time period. The frequency of announcement and corresponding expectation data 
differs among the variables and between countries. This is due to the distinction 
between the frequency of actual data and expectation data. Since I want to examine 
the price reaction the efficient market hypothesis implies that expectations prior an 
announcement are priced in the exchange rate, I need to have both actual and 
expected data for each of the announcement. For announcements were only actual 
data could be provided, the announcement was removed from the sample, although 
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this problem was almost only a concern until expectations was started to be collected, 
in other words in the beginning of the intended sample. 
Here I didn’t use interpolation method for any missed expectation data. Because 
expectation data can only be referred to that specific announcement it corresponds to 
and by using such method would have only provide a false or biased picture of what 
that specific announcement surprise has for impact on the exchange rate. As a 
consequence for this study the frequency and sample size of announcement data 
differs between macro-variables and among examined countries. This difference plays 
out as overweight to number of U.S announcements since Bloomberg has more 
consistently collected expectation data from U.S relative to Swedish, U.K or German 
announcement. I used the U.S announcement data as a benchmark for which data to 
be collected from the other countries, however in the light of this shortcoming of 
finding such data I understand concerns about falling in the same focus as previous 
studies, only toward U.S announcements. This concern is in my opinion 
overestimated since the result showed that number of significant variables overall is 
the same, and I do have data for what previous studies has shown are the most 
valuable announcements to consider. 
 
Table 1. 
  U.S U.K Germany Sweden 
Announcement data 30 12 15 12 
# Of observations 6342 1696 2191 1552 
 
The result for collected data is presented in above table, and as previous stated and 
discussed there is overweight for U.S data while data from U.K, Germany and 
Sweden is more alike (Table 1). For complete information regarding any specific 
announcements, I refer to the appendix section.  
 
M. Asprem (1989) has shown that there is a varied relationship between stock market 
return and macroeconomic announcements among countries. His main finding was 
that countries that had the strongest relationship were France, Germany, Netherland, 
Switzerland and U.K. All these countries can be referred as mature and large 
countries that have at least some impact on global demand. Choosing U.S, U.K and 
Germany as countries announcements to include in this thesis is therefore natural. 
Adding that the level of trade between Sweden and the other countries are significant 
high, there should be a good indicator on how Swedish sensitivity for macroeconomic 
announcements is affected by a global crisis and a drawdown in global demand. 
 
Two types of announcement data are collected, actual release statistics and prior 
announcement expectation data. Actual release statistic together with date is 
assembled and ignoring future adjustment of the statistics. Prior-announcement 
expectation is gathered as an average of analysts reported estimates. This average 
could be seen as the market consensus and according to the efficient market 
hypothesis this average represents what should be priced in the currency. One could 
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argue that the average of market actors estimate of announcement is not sufficient to 
classify as the whole market expectation of the actual release. It is problematic to 
measure the whole market expectation, but using the largest provider of professional 
information services, Bloomberg, that has shown to have market impact and is used in 
other studies like Vrugt (2010), is the best way to estimate market expectations. 
 
Exchange rate, actual announcements data and associated prior-announcement 
expectations are all collected from a Bloomberg terminal. Bloomberg terminal is a 
credible well-used source for investors, analysis and for research papers like this. The 
reason for this is that Bloomberg has the most market share of all professional actors 
in the market and has proved to be having a market impact. 
 
The data is checked for stationary by performing an Augmented Dickey Fuller test. 
The null hypothesis for the ADF-test is that the process has a unit root, meaning that 
the data is non-stationary. For all my announcement variables and data I could reject 
the null hypothesis, rather accepting the alternative that the data has no unit root. This 
means that my data over announcements surprises in this study are stationary 
(Verbeek 2012). For more information about the stationary-test see table 1 in 
appendix where full information is presented. 
 
The modeling of collected data was performed to fit the theoretical framework of the 
efficient market hypothesis which states that the only a market price adjustment occur 
to unexpected news. In other words, if the market expects a certain outcome of a 
macroeconomic announcement, the market has already adjusted the price thereafter. 
In theory, if an outcome (actual release data) of such announcement were in line with 
market expectations, then no reaction, or price adjustment, would appear. 
 
From the provided theoretical argument I will test two data-models, the first model 
for announcement unfolds like this: 
 𝑀!,!! = 𝐴!,!! − 𝐸!,!! 𝜎!,!  
 
Where A is the actual release for macro-subject i announcement at date 𝜏 for country 
n. E is represented by the expectation for macro-subject i and country n at date 𝜏. 
Dividing by 𝜎!,! which is the sample standard deviation of 𝐴!,!! − 𝐸!,!! for the whole 
time period, gives a more comparable results between different types of macro-
announcements surprises. This method of standardize the surprise from 
announcements has been used by Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) and Vrugt (2010) 
in previous studies with arguments of its easier to compare the size of the effect 
different types of announcement has on the exchange rate. It means that the 
interpretation of the regression results should be like of what one standard deviation 
surprise affect on the exchange rate return. This model weights small announcements 
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surprises higher over larger announcements surprises. If the results of this model 
shows an increased sensitivity it will conclude that even smaller prognostic errors 
generates affect on exchange rate return. This transformation do not influence the 
regression result or the level of significant since the sample standard deviation is a 
constant over the whole time period for the specific subject i. This standardize 
announcement surprise effect will be referred as “announcement surprise” in the 
remaining of this thesis.  
 
Since model 1 favors the small surprises, larger surprises would be smaller than true 
reaction. Therefore in model 2 I simply use actual announcements and expectation 
data. Model 2 represents what market actors see and act from in the financial 
terminal.  
 
Model 2, looks like this: 
 𝑀!,!! = 𝐴!,!! − 𝐸!,!! 
 
Where M is the macro variable i at time t for country n, which is equal to actual 
announcement A for macro variable i at time t for country n minus market 
expectations E for announcement A.  
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IV. Methodological approach 
 
The time-period consists of a benchmark that reaches over the whole sample size of 
time, 1995 to 2016. This benchmark will act as the normal reaction structure an 
announcement surprise generates for each of the macro-variables. This will identify 
which macro-announcements that have significant impact on the exchange rate return. 
By dividing the time-period in two additional groups I can compare the divided time 
periods with the benchmark to be able to draw conclusions if the sensitivity of 
announcements surprises has changed over and after the financial crisis. This method 
is a new approach and hasn’t been made in previous studies. The first time period that 
will be compared to the benchmark is between 2005 and 2016. This represents 
foremost the time during the financial crisis and after but also covers the period just 
before the crisis appeared. This period will answer if the sensitivity has changed from 
benchmark over a period of crisis, from the top of the business cycle to the bottom 
and the start of the retracement. While the second time period only will reflect the 
aftermath of the financial crisis and will answer if the sensitivity towards 
announcements surprises has changed with respect of a resent crisis. 
 
The model for estimation is the same for both the benchmark time period as well as 
the other two divided time periods. I will test each currency pair by itself, which will 
be represented by the index variable. Therefore the variable index in the equation 
model will be the exchange rate for USDSEK, GBPSEK and EURSEK. The 
announcements variable, as described in previous section are represented by the 
variable Macro. 
 
Model for testing macroeconomic announcements surprises looks like this: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥! = 𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜!!,! +  𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜!!,!  +⋯+  𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜!!,! + 𝜀! 
 
This model represents each Macro-announcements i, j, x affect on exchange rate 
return index. Where X is either data-model 1 or 2. Estimation will provide the impact 
on daily return on Index at time t from announcement Macro at time t for country n. 
One standard deviation miss from market expectation and one percentage miss from 
expectation will give impact on Index. Both domestic and foreign announcements will 
be included in the same estimation for each specific exchange rate. This means that 
for EURSEK, both German and Swedish announcements will be included. The same 
will hold for USDSEK and EURSEK, but with respective countries announcements 
included. 
 
My model is estimated using an Ordinary Least Squares with Newey-West standard 
errors. Robust standard errors are included to adjust for unknown form of 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Presence of autocorrelation is common found 
in time-series and so showed initial studies of my sample and model, hence 
	 11	
addressing the problem using Ordinary Least Squares with Newey-West standard 
errors will provide robust standard errors. Heteroskedasticity is generally no concern 
in large sample, which my study should subject to since that the divided and smallest 
sample of time period is daily data from 2009 to 2016. However by performing a 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey heteroskedasticity test some of the estimated models suffered 
from heteroskedasticity. By using this Ordinary Least Squares approach, correct 
standard errors will be estimated. A Breusch-Godfrey LM test is performed to check 
for serial correlation. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation in the 
model, if p-value is above 0,05, it means that I cannot reject null hypothesis, rather 
accepting that the model doesn’t suffers from serial correlation.  
 
Since I have both domestic and foreign macroeconomic announcements in the same 
model the number of independent variables tested are quite big. Concerns of 
multicollinearity are addressed by performing a correlation-matrix to exclude any 
correlation between the independent variables before estimation. I found that among 
the Swedish announcements yearly and quarterly GDP as well as import and trade had 
high correlation between them. This resulted in removing quarterly GDP and import 
from sample before estimating the model. 
Among German announcements high correlation between variables current account 
and trade were found and removing current account from sample as a result. No 
suspicious high correlation was found in U.S and U.K announcements. 
A Variance inflation factor test was performed on the estimated regression, to ensure 
no multicollinearity in the final model. The most common restriction for 
multicollinearity is if the variance inflation factor is larger than 10 (Kutner et al. 
2005). However arguments of which level to use is discussed in the literature. 
O’Brien (2007) argue that a value over 10 or even as high as 40 does not by it self 
provide enough evidence of removing suspicious variables. Rogerson (2001) suggest 
over 5 as a limit for multicollinearity. Results VIF-test can be found in appendix.  
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V. Results 
 
The results will be presented in two parts, first the benchmark time period, which 
represents the normal reaction structure towards announcements surprises. The 
second part will present the results from the divided time period, i.e. for the 2005 time 
period and for the 2009 time period. The second part result will presents as a 
comparison against benchmark in order to determine the reaction sensitivity for the 
2008 crisis. The tools for this purpose are the two models for announcements 
surprises described in data-discussion. The interpretation of the model 1 is how one 
standard deviation surprise affects exchange rate return. For model 2, the 
interpretation is how one percent announcement surprise from market expectation 
affects exchange rate return.  
 
Benchmark 
 
As the timeline for benchmark represents the normal reaction structure of 
announcements surprises, this period and the significant variables found could be 
interpret as the announcements surprises that normally have an impact on the 
exchange rate return.  
 
What is clear when only examining number of significant variables is that there is 
overweight for significant Swedish announcements over U.K and German ditto. There 
are also fewer Swedish variables that have an affect over USDSEK than in GBPSEK 
and EURSEK, and where the relationship is a more equal regarding number of 
influential variables between Swedish and U.S announcements. German 
announcements have the least number of significant variables while the Swedish has 
the most for all three exchange rates in EURSEK (Table 1 & 2). 
Even though looking at the absolute average affect could show a bias of the results for 
variables with relative low or high affect it provides an indication of the affect 
structure for each country and a good outline for later specification of the results. 
Here I found as in number of significant variables for Sweden over German 
announcements, the Swedish generates overall a greater impact that is visual for both 
models. In benchmark there is also an overall equal reaction towards announcements 
surprises in USDSEK and in GBPSEK (Table 3 & 4). 
 
The most common influential macro-variables for all three exchange rates are retail 
sales, consumer price index, manufacturing price measure index and GDP. 
Starting with the announcements connected to consumption, consumer price index for 
Sweden is significant for all three exchange rate returns. The announcements 
surprises generate an impact on all three exchange rates on average -12 basis points in 
model 1 and around -0,65 basis points in model 2. For the compared countries only 
U.K announcements have a significant impact in the benchmark period, which 
reaction showed to be stronger than the Swedish ones of about 18 basis points in 
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model 1 and 105 basis points in model 2. Meaning that in model 1 a positive one 
standard deviation surprise generates an appreciation of GBPSEK with 0,18 % and in 
model 2, a percentage outcome surprise affect GBPSEK with 1,05 %. For Swedish 
announcements this relationship is negative, which implies that the Krona appreciates 
and the ratio GBPSEK decreases. In general model 1 have smaller coefficients than 
model 2, this is due to the standardizing the announcements surprise to focus the 
affect on smaller market expectation errors.  
 
Retail sales are another announcement that have a widespread impact on return. The 
Swedish announcement has significant impact over all three exchange rates, however 
the reaction is quite small and on average is about -0,12 basis point for both models. 
U.K retail sales have a significant impact of 0,18 basis points in model 1 and 0,25 
basis points impact in model 2 while the German and U.S equivalence cannot be 
proved significant in benchmark period.  
 
Moving on to manufacturing price measure index the Swedish announcements 
surprise still generates more affect than the compared countries in model 1 but in 
model 2 the affect is reported very small, while for U.S and German the opposite 
relation holds. This means that Swedish announcements are more sensitive to small 
prognostic errors while the U.S and German generates a greater reaction for a 
percentage miss from expectations.  
 
Policy rates generally do not affect the exchange rate return in the benchmark period, 
with the exception for Swedish policy announcement in EURSEK, where the affect 
can be summarized to -26 basis points for a standard deviation surprise and -180 bp 
for a percentage expectation miss. To some what surprising that U.S, U.K or ECB 
policy rate announcements doesn’t have a significant impact on exchange rate, 
however it could be the case that in general (benchmark) expectation are more 
accurate for actual policy rate announcement and therefore no significant affect is 
presented.  
 
Strongest impact reaction was generated from U.S service PMI where a standard 
deviation announcement surprise affects USDSEK exchange rate return with 0,44 % 
in model one and in model two Swedish policy rate surprises generated strongest 
reaction with a 1,80 % on EURSEK. 
Among other significant announcements variables in benchmark I found U.S personal 
spending, unemployment and import. For U.K industrial production service PMI, and 
yearly GDP were significant and for German announcements Import was significant.  
 
The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test cannot be rejected for all three tested 
exchange rates returns and for both of the models tested, meaning that the model has 
no serial correlation. From the variance inflation factor test I can conclude that the 
model isn’t affected by multicollinearity. There is some correlation between the 
variables since the factor is above one, however all variables reported a value under 5 
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which only can classifies as moderate correlated and isn’t a problem for the stability 
of the estimate. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Shows the absolute reaction of those variables that has increased sensitivity 
from benchmark over 2005 and 2009 time period. 
 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Shows the absolute reaction of those variables that has increased sensitivity 
from benchmark over 2005 and 2009 time period. 
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Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Shows the absolute reaction of those variables that has increased sensitivity 
from benchmark over 2005 and 2009 time period. 
 
 
2005 and 2009 time period 
 
While the benchmark time period provided solid evidence of significant macro-
economic variables to account for when analyzing announcements affects in general, 
we move now on to see how sensitive the reaction of announcements surprises are for 
the crisis. 
 
Number of significant announcements variables has small variations from benchmark. 
Swedish announcements are still in overweight for GBPSEK and EURSEK, and in 
USDSEK number of significant variables for U.S went down while Swedish 
significant variables increases. Therefore Swedish announcements variables have a 
broader influence on all exchange rates than the compared countries. (Table 2 & 3 
appendix) 
 
The absolute average impact reaction increases most in USDSEK for both Swedish 
and U.S announcements, where U.S has most sensitivity. However the U.S absolute 
average reaction bias for the large increased reaction in Policy rates announcements, 
which is most visual in model 2. Sensitivity increases also for Swedish 
announcements in GPBSEK and EURSEK, while German and U.K announcements in 
EURSEK is unchanged, and decreases in GBPSEK. Where the reaction increases 
from benchmark, it is noticeable that the reaction for 2009 time period is greater than 
for 2005. Meaning that there are signs that sensitivity for announcement surprises is 
larger for when the first stage in the crisis has appeared (in 2008), than for the period 
that includes all stages of the crisis (Figure 4 & 5 appendix). 
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For those variables that exhibit increased sensitivity to the crisis it is clear that the 
reaction increases over the two divided time periods. First an increased reaction in 
2005 against benchmark appears and corresponds to the affect of the business cycle. 
Then only observing 2009 time period an additional increased reaction appears from 
period 2005, which represents the time after the crisis. Therefore in general sensitivity 
is as largest after a crisis rather than over the whole business cycle (Figure 1, 2 and 3) 
 
Since the financial crisis in 2008 begun central banks has used their most important 
tool for keeping inflation at a stable level (or fighting for higher inflation), the policy 
rate. The connection to the currency has been important, especially for Sweden 
whereas the Swedish Riksbank, repeatedly expressed concerns of the Swedish Krona 
value that in their minds, in relation to the best for Swedish economy is to high 
(Ingves, Stefan 2015).  
 
The focus on policy rates is visual in the results and the sensitivity has increased over 
the crisis. The impact affects for Swedish announcements are similar for all three 
exchange rates. In benchmark, for both models, with small and insignificant influence 
on GBPSEK and USDSEK, the sensitivity and reaction has increased to a significant -
54 basis points in USDSEK and -37 basis points in GBPSEK in model 1. While same 
reaction structure is visual in model 2 where GBPSEK are affected by a surprise 
announcement with -260 basis points and for USDSEK this number is -376 basis 
points. 
 
For U.S the reaction is vastly increased for 2005 and even more in 2009 time period. 
A percentage difference from expectations will generate an affect of 2,1 % in 2005 
and 12,21 % in 2009. However the big coefficient in 2009 time period must be put in 
relation to the low level and small changes of the policy rate, where a whole 1 percent 
difference from expectations isn’t likely to appear. Therefore it could be more 
interesting to look at model 1 and the fact that U.S policy rate changes signs and 
becomes negative, hence a somewhat theoretical contradiction where reaction of a 
positive announcement surprise depreciate the value of USD. However few 
announcements have under the 2009 time period been unanticipated by the market 
and after a long time with low interest rates, when FED decided to raise, it was what 
the market was waiting for. Therefore the change to negative is more of a sign for 
market sell off rather than absolute results for crisis in general. Therefore I am careful 
in the conclusion of U.S policy announcements sensitivity for crisis. 
 
For EURSEK all periods are significant for policy rates announcements, and the 
reaction has increased from benchmark for both models from -26 basis points in 
model 1 and -180 basis points in model 2 to 2005 reaction of -31 basis points in 
model 1 and -217 basis points in model 2. In the period after the crisis has appeared 
announcements surprises generates and reaction of -57 basis points in model 1 and -
391 basis points in model 2. UK and ECB (used for German) policy announcements 
have no significant affect on any time period.  
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The second most influential announcement is Consumer price index. My results show 
an increased reaction for Swedish announcements. The U.K are significant influential 
for 2005 but not for 2009, but have no changed reaction structure over this period. 
U.S and German have no significant influence for any time period. Left alone are 
Swedish announcements where the reaction sensitivity follows the same path as for 
policy rates. From relative low impact in benchmark to increase in 2005 time period 
and then increase even more in 2009 time period. This reaction isn’t that surprising 
since inflation, or rather the post-financial crisis lack of it, has been the greatest 
concern for central banks since the crisis started. The financial market has therefore 
also focus more towards CPI to forecast how the central banks will act in the future.  
However, what is surprising is that only Swedish announcement has a significant 
influence over the exchange rate return.  
 
Retail sales had a broad impact on the benchmark period, which continues to be an 
influential announcement for exchange rate return in the divided time periods. 
Especially in EURSEK where both Swedish and German announcement generates a 
larger affect than benchmark. In GBPSEK Swedish announcement surprise exhibit the 
same reaction structure as for EURSEK and increases, while U.K and U.S 
announcements in USDSEK is relatively unchanged.  
 
Manufacturing price measure index as in benchmark was an important and significant 
variable for all countries, is still an important and significant variable in the divided 
time periods. However the sensitivity has not changed for all of them, the affect on 
daily return only shows increased reaction for Swedish announcements in GBPSEK 
and EURSEK and for U.S announcements in USDSEK. The change in the divided 
time periods is also quite small in comparison towards policy rate and retail sales.  
 
GDP announcements in 2005 and 2009 compared to benchmark are only significant 
for Swedish and U.K announcements and the reaction structure shows only a small 
increased affect against benchmark results. However Swedish announcements tend to 
be more important for the exchange rate than the compared countries when it comes 
to small prognostic errors. U.K however increases most in model 2, and a percentage 
expectation error increase GBPSEK return with 0,8 %.  
 
Other announcements that had an increased sensitivity but wasn’t significant for all 
time periods or for all three exchange rates was observed in U.S imports, Swedish 
unemployment for GBPSEK and German trade announcements. 
 
Again the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test cannot be rejected for any of 
the remaining time periods. This means, as in benchmark, that no serial correlation 
exists in the model and the estimate. The multicollinearity test in the variance 
inflation factor is low for all announcements, and as in benchmark, there isn’t any 
multicollinearity in the final model estimated. 
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Also here all model has a very low R-squared, which is not that surprising since other 
factors impact the daily return other than announcement surprises and with a large 
time period the model used cannot explain all the daily returns. However focus is to 
explain and examine the sensitivity for announcements surprises and not a model for 
exchange rate return.   
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VI. General Discussion 
 
Comparing U.S and Swedish announcements I find more similarities than differences. 
The reaction structure is similar between them in benchmark as in the time periods for 
crisis. There are several announcements that have a significant impact on USDSEK, 
but doesn’t necessarily generates a greater reaction in the divided time periods. The 
increased sensitivity is foremost visual in consumer price index, policy rates and 
imports, where policy rates is the absolute most important and reactive 
announcement. UK and Swedish announcements provides a similar affect in 
benchmark but the sensitivity only increases for Swedish announcements. Consumer 
price index, GDP, Manufacturing price measure index, retail sales and policy rates are 
all having increased affect in crisis. Swedish and German announcements are more 
different. Swedish announcements tend to be more important, influential and increase 
in reaction over the crisis. Where the German announcements had small and no 
increased sensitivity over the time periods. The most sensitive announcements were 
consumer price index, GDP, policy rates and retail sales. The concentration towards 
the same types of announcements is in line with previous research from Flemming 
and Ramelona. This also strengthens McQueen and Roleys (1990) connection to the 
business cycle, although not for all variables included. 
 
The main interesting result in this study is that a factor for a small-developed country 
seems to be the interaction with the compared country. For Sweden the sensitivity is 
more reactive in GBPSEK and EURSEK, while the sensitivity for U.K and German 
announcements is almost nonexistent. Sweden, U.K and Germany have a closer 
collaboration than Sweden and U.S since the membership in the European union. 
Because the Swedish economy is focused towards exports and trade a close 
cooperation could in a European crisis impact the uncertainty of Swedish economy 
more than from other countries, for example as in my study U.S.  
 
It is problematic for this study that Germany doesn’t have its “own” currency, as the 
other countries in this study has. The euro is not only affected by the performance and 
outlook of the German economy. It is reasonable to argue that other countries 
including the whole euro-collaboration affecting the value of the euro more than any 
individual member/country. In terms of crisis, as the 2008 crisis and the aftermath, the 
German economy was one of the best performing countries in the euro area. While 
other countries struggled, it is reasonable to argue that the uncertainty from the euro 
area determines the value of the euro more than the German performance. This could 
explain the dampened affect from German announcements in my results. A change or 
including euro-statistic announcements could have exposed a different result however 
struggle of finding appropriate data dismissed the euro area from this study. 
 
U.S economy affects the global demand and therefore has a large influence on the 
exchange rate, however Swedish announcements are found to be equally important 
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for the return. This separates Swedish from previous studies of emerging markets that 
showed a unilateral influence from U.S over domestic announcements. As a 
consequence from higher market efficiency expectations are easier to estimate for 
Swedish announcements than for some emerging markets, which could be an 
explanation. Another reason could be that the Swedish economy isn’t as dependent on 
U.S contribution for the global demand as other countries with a more equal response 
on the exchange rate as a result. 
 
The difference between the two models is in general that the standardized model 
shifts focus and tries to catch up the small prognostic errors for announcements. 
Except for the models different interpretation of the results it is no surprise that the 
coefficients are smaller. The result isn’t that much affected by the difference of the 
two models. For most of the case it even shows the same proportion of sensitivity 
between benchmark and the divided time series as model 2 did. Although whereas 
large announcements surprises are dampened, as seen in policy rate and CPI. 
However the small prognostic errors is visual in the results where the affect differs 
and is larger from model 2. For example in GBPSEK exchange rate Swedish PPI and 
U.K service PMI had greater coefficients than for model 2, however non of them 
changes the reaction structure in the divided time periods. The same thing holds for 
EURSEK exchange rate for Swedish consumer confidence and industrial production. 
Equal reaction structure in USDSEK is observed for Swedish manufacturing PMI and 
retail sales. Although, the only variable that had different reaction for small 
announcements surprises was Swedish manufacturing PMI in GBPSEK where the 
reaction pointed out an increased sensitivity. 
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VII. Conclusions 
 
The financial crisis of 2008 placed the global economy in the worse recession since 
the great depression. As a consequence it worsen the economic outlook and in general 
worsen the macroeconomic statistics. By comparing the benchmark results for a 
normal reaction structure with the divided time periods over the time for the crisis I 
found that the reaction structure changes. My findings were in line with previous 
studies from Flemming and Ramelona, Vrught and McQueen and Roley among others 
that announcement variable are most affected by uncertainty and the business cycle. 
But the crisis also increased the sensitivity for some variables more than other. U.S 
announcements are still an important factor and with their global position they affect 
the rest of the world. This is visual in USDSEK, although the difference from 
emerging market countries are clear, and as Vrught (2010) points out, its not only U.S 
announcements that matters. Swedish announcements are equally important and 
exhibit the same sensitivity structure as for U.S. One common ground for the results 
was that Swedish announcements tend to be more reactive for crisis than U.K and 
German. Uncertainty in the region of the EU collaboration seems to strike against 
Sweden. It could be the case that Sweden’s economic characteristics with high export 
make them more sensitive for announcements surprises in terms of high outside 
uncertainty. I argue therefore the reason for this is either that Swedish announcements 
are harder to predict in crisis due to the close relationship with larger trading partners 
or that the market are more nervous for what implications a global or a close neighbor 
crisis has on a country like Sweden. The fact that Sweden managed to perform quite 
well in the crisis relative to other European countries it should therefore be more 
realistic that Swedish announcements had a low sensitivity instead of the opposite, 
which strengthens my conclusion of that exchange rate not fully prices Swedish 
announcements in crisis.  
 
Since Sweden is a quite small economy in association to U.K, Germany and U.S it 
would be interesting to examine if the same relation follows for other similar 
countries against the larger more global market actors as in this study. For future 
research I also think it would be interesting to see if “brexit” affect the GBPSEK 
exchange rate returns to further examine if close collaboration generates a greater 
reaction for smaller countries announcements surprises in terms of crisis. That of 
course depends on whether the relationship between Sweden and U.K is affected from 
U.K leaving the European union. 
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IX. Appendix 
 
Table 1. Overview of macroeconomic announcement used in this study, data collected 
from Bloomberg terminal.  
Announcement First obs. Last obs. 
# Of 
obs. 
Unit root 
t-stat Prob. 1 % 
Reject 
H0? 
US Manufacturing PMI 13-05-01 16-04-01 36 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
US GDPQ 97-06-25 16-03-25 72 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
US Policy Rate 97-05-20 16-03-16 158 -74,53 -3,43 Yes 
US Trade 97-03-20 16-04-15 230 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
US Budget Deficit 97-01-21 15-12-31 228 -74,43 -3,43 Yes 
US CPI 97-02-19 16-03-16 230 -74,46 -3,43 Yes 
US PPI 97-12-12 14-01-15 194 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
US Retail Sales 01-06-13 16-03-15 178 -20,5 -3,43 Yes 
US Consumer confidence 97-02-25 16-03-29 230 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
US Unemployment 97-02-07 16-04-01 231 -74,49 -3,43 Yes 
US Industrial Production 97-02-14 16-03-16 230 -74,48 -3,43 Yes 
US Jobless claims 97-07-03 16-04-07 980 -74,5 -3,43 Yes 
US Housing stat 98-03-17 16-03-16 217 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
US existing home sales 05-03-23 16-03-21 133 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
US New Home sales 98-06-02 16-03-23 215 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
US Durable goods sales 97-11-26 16-04-04 219 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
US Inflation expectations 99-05-28 16-04-01 203 -74,56 -3,43 Yes 
US current account 98-09-10 16-03-17 71 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
US ADP 06-08-30 16-03-30 116 -74,46 -3,43 Yes 
US NFP 97-02-07 16-04-01 231 -74,5 -3,43 Yes 
US Service PMI 14-04-03 16-04-05 25 -17,11 -3,43 Yes 
US Industrial PMI 97-02-03 16-04-01 231 -74,42 -3,43 Yes 
US Imports 98-08-13 16-03-11 212 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
US Personal Spending 97-03-03 16-03-28 230 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
US Non-Manufacturing PMI 08-02-05 16-04-05 99 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
US Personal Income 97-03-03 16-03-28 230 -74,49 -3,43 Yes 
US Chicago PMI 97-04-30 16-03-30 228 -74,46 -3,43 Yes 
US Capital Utilization 97-02-14 16-03-16 230 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
US Business Inventories 97-07-16 16-03-15 225 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
US Leading Indicator 97-03-04 16-03-17 230 -74,5 -3,43 Yes 
UK Manufacturing PMI 13-05-01 16-04-01 36 -74,42 -3,43 Yes 
UK GDPQ 98-12-21 16-03-31 70 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
UK Policy rate 98-10-08 16-03-17 210 -12,34 -3,43 Yes 
UK Trade 06-10-10 16-04-08 115 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
UK CPI 04-01-20 16-03-22 147 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
UK PPI 97-06-09 16-03-22 226 -74,46 -3,43 Yes 
UK Retail sales 97-02-19 16-03-24 230 -74,59 -3,43 Yes 
UK Consumer confidence 03-01-30 16-03-30 159 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
UK Unemployment 02-05-15 16-03-16 167 -74,46 -3,43 Yes 
UK Industrial production 97-03-12 16-04-08 230 -74,75 -3,43 Yes 
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UK GDPY 98-12-21 16-03-31 70 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
UK Service PMI 13-05-03 16-04-05 36 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
TY Manufacturing PMI 13-05-02 16-04-01 36 -8,85 -3,43 Yes 
TY GDPQ 97-06-05 16-02-23 76 -74,47 -3,43 Yes 
TY Policy Rate (ECB) 00-10-05 16-03-10 185 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
TY Trade 02-02-12 16-04-08 171 -74,48 -3,43 Yes 
TY CPI 03-02-26 16-03-30 159 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
TY PPI 97-02-24 16-03-18 230 -10,7 -3,43 Yes 
TY Retail sales 98-04-16 16-03-31 216 -74,72 -3,43 Yes 
TY Consumer confidence 06-07-27 16-02-25 116 -74,46 -3,43 Yes 
TY Unemployment 98-10-06 16-03-31 211 -74,58 -3,43 Yes 
TY Industrial production 97-04-03 16-04-04 229 -74,49 -3,43 Yes 
TY Current account 02-02-12 16-04-08 171 -74,52 -3,43 Yes 
TY Business condition 04-02-24 16-03-22 146 -74,47 -3,43 Yes 
TY GDPY 99-06-30 15-12-31 61 -74,49 -3,43 Yes 
TY Service PMI 13-05-06 16-04-05 36 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
TY Import 03-11-11 16-04-08 148 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
SW Manufacturing PMI 04-12-01 16-04-01 135 -74,43 -3,43 Yes 
SW GDPQ 97-06-11 16-02-29 76 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
SW Policy rate 01-07-06 16-02-11 96 -74,52 -3,43 Yes 
SW Trade 97-03-25 16-03-29 175 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
SW CPI 97-03-12 16-03-15 229 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
SW PPI 97-03-26 14-05-26 205 -74,48 -3,43 Yes 
SW Retail sales 03-04-29 16-03-29 156 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
SW Consumer confidence 13-07-25 16-03-23 33 -74,46 -3,43 Yes 
SW Unemployment 07-11-15 16-03-17 101 -74,45 -3,43 Yes 
SW Industrial production 04-03-10 16-04-05 146 -74,49 -3,43 Yes 
SW GDPY 02-09-25 16-02-29 55 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
SW Import 04-03-25 16-03-29 145 -74,44 -3,43 Yes 
Table 1. Shows Macroeconomic announcement, first observation collected, last 
observation collected, numbers of observations used in this study and the result from 
the unit root test of Augmented Dickey Fuller test. Rejection of null hypothesis 
implies stationary data.  
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Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Shows number of variable that have a significant influence on the exchange rate 
return for model 1.  
 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Shows number of variables that have a significant influence on the exchange rate 
return for model 2. 
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Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Shows the absolute average affect of model 1. Interpretation reads one standard 
deviation surprise affect on exchange rate return. Only significant variables from each 
exchange rate are included. 
 
Table 5.
 
Table 5. Shows the absolute average affect of model 2. Interpretation reads one percentage 
announcement surprise affect on exchange rate return. Only significant variable from each 
exchange rate are included. 
 
0,00	 0,10	 0,20	 0,30	 0,40	 0,50	 0,60	Swedish	
U.S	Sweden	
U.K	Sweden	
Germany	
USDSE
K	GB
PSEK	
EURSE
K	
Model	
1	 2009	2005	Bench	
0,00	 0,50	 1,00	 1,50	 2,00	 2,50	 3,00	 3,50	 4,00	Swedish	
U.S	Sweden	
U.K	Sweden	
Germany	
USDSE
K	GB
PSEK	
EURSE
K	
Model	
2	 2009	2005	Bench	
	 28	
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Shows the absolute reaction of those variables that has increased sensitivity 
from benchmark over 2005 and 2009 time period. 
 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Shows the absolute reaction of those variables that has increased sensitivity 
from benchmark over 2005 and 2009 time period. 
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Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Shows the absolute reaction of those variables that has increased sensitivity 
from benchmark over 2005 and 2009 time period. 
 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 shows the absolute reaction of those variables that has increased sensitivity 
from benchmark over 2005 and 2009 time period. 
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Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 shows the absolute reaction of those variables that has increased sensitivity 
from benchmark over 2005 and 2009 time period. 
 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 shows the absolute reaction of those variables that has increased sensitivity 
from benchmark over 2005 and 2009 time period. 
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Table 12. 
Model 1 
USDSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
CPI_sw 
-0,1352*** -0,285*** -0,44*** 
(0,052) (0,0799) (0,0998) 
GDPY_sw 
-0,3422*** -0,3606*** -0,3494*** 
(0,1116) (0,1172) (0,1203) 
industrial production_us 
0,1018* 0,0981 0,0201 
(0,0589) (0,0817) (0,1096) 
Man.PMI_sw 
-0,301*** .-0,297*** -0,2726*** 
(0,0815) (0,0823) (0,096) 
Man.PMI_us 
0,1416* 0,1603* 0,1934* 
(0,0854) (0,092) (0,1053) 
Personal spend_us 
0,0928* -0,0415 0,0431 
(0,0451) (0,0801) (0,1081) 
PPI_us 
-0,1355** 0,0305 0,119 
(0,0625) (0,0698) (0,1178) 
Retail sales_sw 
-0,1029** -0,1341*** -0,1521** 
(0,0483) (0,0496) (0,0678) 
Service PMI_us 
0,4425** 0,4502** 0,4184** 
(0,1818) (0,1906) (0,185) 
Unemployment_us 
-0,1007** -0,0813 0,1146 
(0,052) (0,0694) (0,0833) 
Policy rate_sw 
-0,1233 -0,1886* -0,5416*** 
(0,0958) (0,1117) (0,1437) 
Policy rate_us 
0,1045 0,2224*** -1,343*** 
(0,0796) (0,0681) (0,4109) 
Import_us 
0,0572 0,1209 0,2948*** 
(0,0623) (0,0833) (0,0908) 
R-squared 0,051088 0,075 0,12124 
Adjusted R-squared 0,023049 0,022001 0,040522 
S,E, of regression 0,007379 0,007989 0,008156 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 0,7866 0,6072 0,4709 
Breusch-Pagan heterosc. test 0 0 0,0771 
Regression result model 1 for exchange rate USDSEK including benchmark and the 
divided time periods. Displays only the macroeconomic announcements that have a 
significant impact in at least one time period.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: *** = 1 %, ** = 5 %, * = 10 %. 
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Table 13. 
Model 1 
GBPSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
Consumer conf._sw 
-0,1767** -0,172** -0,173** 
(0,842) (0,0857) (0,0844) 
CPI_sw 
-0,0995** -0,205*** -0,25*** 
(0,0425) (0,0557) (0,0627) 
CPI_uk 
0,1774** 0,1981** 0,1966 
(0,0893) (0,0951) (0,135) 
GDPY_sw 
-0,1276 -0,298*** -0,308*** 
(0,0809) (0,101) (0,105) 
GDPY_uk 
0,1437** 0,1676** 0,1595* 
(0,0504) (0,0682) (0,0868) 
Industrial prod._uk 
0,1279** -0,085* 0,1218 
(0,0551) (0,0495) (0,1079) 
Man.PMI_sw 
-0,173*** -0,173*** -0,279*** 
(0,0655) (0,0665) (0,0814) 
PPI_sw 
-0,1112** -0,1112** -0,123 
(0,05) (0,0614) (0,0778) 
Retail sales_sw 
-0,1254*** -0,1254*** -0,196*** 
(0,039) (0,0425) (0,0579) 
Retail sales_uk 
0,1788* 0,1788*** 0,1985** 
(0,0441) (0,0547) (0,0776) 
Service PMI_uk 
0,2384*** 0,2384*** 0,2513*** 
(0,0885) (0,0872) (0,0852) 
Unemployment_sw 
0,2454*** 0,2454*** 0,2853** 
(0,0764) (0,0762) (0,0718) 
Man.PMI_uk 
0,1049 0,1065 0,1083* 
(0,0717) (0,0708) (0,0599) 
Policy rate_sw -0,0342 -0,05 -0,374** 
 (0,0797) (0,1052) (0,1763) R-squared 0,038648 0,060868 0,080658 
Adjusted R-squared 0,02331 0,03217 0,03843 
S,E, of regression 0,006296 0,006563 0,006912 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 0,8349 0,7187 0,1011 
Breusch-Pagan heterosc. test 0,0394 0,5414 0,1851 
 
Regression result model 1 for exchange rate GBPSEK including benchmark and the 
divided time periods. Displays only the macroeconomic announcements that have a 
significant impact in at least one time period.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: *** = 1 %, ** = 5 %, * = 10 %. 
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Table 14. 
Model 1 
EURSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
Consumer conf._sw 
.-0,0916* .-0,0873* .-0,0896* 
0,0481 0,0477 0,0475 
CPI_sw 
.-0,1199*** .-0,2531*** .-0,3797*** 
0,038 0,0537 0,0699 
GDPY_sw 
.-0,327*** .-0,3393*** .-0,3859*** 
0,0694 0,0757 0,0716 
Import_gr 
.-0,0785* -0,0795 -0,1078 
0,0464 0,0503 0,0719 
Industrial prod._sw 
.-0,1258*** .-0,1381*** .-0,1618*** 
0,0362 0,0385 0,0488 
Man.PMI_gr 
0,0845* 0,086* 0,0975* 
0,0473 0,0488 0,0516 
Man.PMI_sw 
.-0,2437*** .-0,2412*** .-0,2925*** 
0,0521 0,0523 0,061 
Policy rate_sw 
.-0,26*** .-0,3126*** .-0,5726*** 
0,0594 0,0815 0,129 
Retail sales_sw 
.-0,1211*** .-0,1434*** .-0,1874*** 
0,0297 0,0328 0,0478 
Retail sales_gr 
-0,0295 .-0,0815* .-0,1042* 
0,0288 0,045 0,0616 
Unemployment_sw 
0,1693*** 0,1599*** 0,1666*** 
0,0519 0,0518 0,0634 
Trade_gr 
-0,0248 -0,0573 .-0,0865* 
0,0322 0,0422 0,0522 
R-squared 0,054214 0,094134 0,129001 
Adjusted R-squared 0,036465 0,063821 0,083414 
S,E, of regression 0,004617 0,004538 0,004904 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 0,4041 0,2222 0,1536 
Breusch-Pagan heterosc. test 0,0165 0,1178 0,9259 
 
Regression result model 1 for exchange rate EURSEK including benchmark and the 
divided time periods. Displays only the macroeconomic announcements that have a 
significant impact in at least one time period.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: *** = 1 %, ** = 5 %, * = 10 %. 
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Table 15. 
Model 2 
USDSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
CPI_sw 
-0,74214*** -1,567313*** -2,443064*** 
(0,285262) (0,436862) (0,542096) 
Man.PMI_sw 
-0,074878*** -0,073896*** -0,067775*** 
(0,020263) (0,020455) (0,023871) 
Man. PMI_us 
0,218607*** 0,246515* 0,297259* 
(0,131311) (0,141305) (0,161682) 
Personal spend._us 
0,537848** -0,252794 0,245856 
(0,263336) (0,465477) (0,62924) 
PPI_sw 
-0,28394** -0,271569 -0,256508 
(0,130995) (0,16711) (0,199144) 
Retail sales_sw 
-0,103957** -0,135783*** -0,156182** 
(0,048652) (0,049909) (0,06836) 
Service PMI_us 
0,579436** 0,589376*** 0,548381** 
(0,238144) (0,249502) (0,241896) 
Unemployment_us 
-0,735198** -0,561094 -0,098091 
(0,358682) (0,478594) (0,600344) 
GDPY_sw 
-0,418739 -0,441587*** -0,42649*** 
(0,136239) (0,143088) (0,146438) 
Policy rate_sw 
-0,853286 -1,294339* -3,76515*** 
(0,667835) (0,784596) (0,998019) 
Policy rate_us 
0,974827 2,066723*** 12,21006*** 
(0,741553) (0,633757) (3,845391) 
Import_us 
0,099308 0,2105 0,513663*** 
(0,108422) (0,144837) (0,158204) 
R-squared 0,050862 0,074462 0,120258 
Adjusted R-squared 0,023543 0,022839 0,041664 
S,E, of regression 0,007377 0,007985 0,008151 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 0,6832 0,6832 0,4708 
Breusch-Pagan heterosc. test 0 0 0,072 
 
Regression result model 2 for exchange rate USDSEK including benchmark and the 
divided time periods. Displays only the macroeconomic announcements that have a 
significant impact in at least one time period.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: *** = 1 %, ** = 5 %, * = 10 %. 
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Table 16. 
Model 2 
GBPSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
Consumer conf._sw 
-0,076875** -0,075506** -0,075937** 
(0,036564) (0,037321) (0,036738) 
CPI_sw 
-0,53** -1,130221*** -1,377576*** 
(0,234288) (0,306634) (0,344589) 
CPI_uk 
1,053935** 1,180642** 1,171809 
(0,530703) (0,565717) (0,803361) 
GDPY_sw 
-0,326466*** -0,370467*** -0,406914*** 
(0,093741) (0,094709) (0,10771) 
GDPY_uk 
0,706635*** 0,827481** 0,794619* 
(0,248408) (0,334958) (0,426152) 
Industrial prod._uk 
0,200694** 0,187283 0,19071 
(0,086657) (0,139859) (0,169911) 
Industrial prod._sw 
-0,031819 -0,0468* -0,052458 
(0,027205) (0,027787) (0,032683) 
Man.PMI_sw 
-0,043845*** -0,042079** -0,072114*** 
(0,016356) (0,016655) (0,020335) 
Man.PMI_uk 
0,040806 0,041471 0,041892* 
(0,026748) (0,026402) (0,022578) 
PPI_Sw 
-0,243621** -0,271027** -0,273388* 
(0,104494) (0,128812) (0,164233) 
Policy rate_sw 
-0,273225 -0,348072 -2,600732** 
(0,5586) (0,730338) (1,224107) 
Retail sales_sw 
-0,135199*** -0,164502*** -0,214318*** 
(0,038831) (0,042765) (0,057975) 
Retail sales_uk 
0,255997*** 0,220447*** 0,28112** 
(0,062888) (0,077939) (0,110513) 
Service PMI_uk 
0,087337*** 0,0856*** 0,091934*** 
(0,032116) (0,032336) (0,031889) 
Unemployment_sw 
0,891757*** 0,841296*** 1,029697*** 
(0,277056) (0,276923) (0,260289) 
    
R-squared 0,0391 0,061911 0,082253 
Adjusted R-squared 0,023769 0,033244 0,040098 
S,E, of regression 0,006295 0,006559 0,006906 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 0,9007 0,8116 0,1325 
Breusch-Pagan heterosc. test 0,0376 0,5424 0,1574 
 
Regression result model 2 for exchange rate GBPSEK including benchmark and the 
divided time periods. Displays only the macroeconomic announcements that have a 
significant impact in at least one time period.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: *** = 1 %, ** = 5 %, * = 10 %. 
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Table 17. 
Model 2 
EURSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
Consumer conf._sw 
-0,03981* -0,03683* -0,03832* 
(0,020883) (0,021123) (0,020855) 
CPI_sw 
-0,65766*** -1,38009*** -2,06598*** 
(0,208385) (0,293555) (0,385417) 
GDPY_sw 
-0,39978*** -0,41672 -0,47707*** 
(0,084481) (0,088526) (0,082379) 
Import_gr 
-0,02536* -0,02592 -0,03323 
(0,01497) (0,016217) (0,022771) 
Industrial prod._sw 
-0,07059*** -0,07676*** -0,09061*** 
(0,020344) (0,021524) (0,027311) 
Man.PMI_gr 
0,144764* 0,147789* 0,165242* 
(0,08101) (0,085031) (0,089717) 
Man.PMI_sw 
-0,06067*** -0,05994*** -0,07361*** 
(0,012981) (0,012719) (0,014982) 
Policy rate_sw 
-1,80664*** -2,17973*** -3,91653*** 
(0,412929) (0,540184) (0,897325) 
Retail sales_gr 
-0,01623 -0,04495* -0,06004* 
(0,015873) (0,024652) (0,033814) 
Retail sales_sw 
-0,12198*** -0,14159*** -0,19097*** 
(0,029919) (0,033346) (0,04833) 
Unemplyment_sw 
0,617075*** 0,588317*** 0,627995*** 
(0,189351) (0,188277) (0,233074) 
R-squared 0,054214 0,098073 0,133074 
Adjusted R-squared 0,036465 0,066907 0,085664 
S,E, of regression 0,004617 0,004531 0,004898 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 0,4041 0,4984 0,0633 
Breusch-Pagan heterosc. test 0,0165 0,0342 0,3963 
 
Regression result model 2 for exchange rate EURSEK including benchmark and the 
divided time periods. Displays only the macroeconomic announcements that have a 
significant impact in at least one time period.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. P-values: *** = 1 %, ** = 5 %, * = 10 %. 
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Table 18. 
Model 1 
USDSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
CPI_sw 1,550295 1,805587 1,959635 
GDPY_sw 1,647414 2,04452 3,239829 
industrial production_us 3,713769 2,100892 2,211353 
Man.PMI_sw 2,174805 2,481508 2,807549 
Man.PMI_us 1,699964 1,885032 2,278048 
Personal spend_us 1,639963 2,147468 2,81533 
PPI_us 1,82878 2,017139 2,652672 
Retail sales_sw 1,505603 1,636675 2,762831 
Service PMI_us 1,36251 2,426088 1,594301 
Unemployment_us 1,435622 1,748747 2,545895 
Policy rate_sw 4,127926 4,630743 3,134724 
Policy rate_us 2,662362 3,971265 3,410463 
Import_us 1,834415 2,30102 1,688217 
 
Table 18. Variance Inflation Factor test for model 1 in USDSEK estimation. 
 
Table 19. 
Model 2 
USDSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
CPI_sw 1,550295 1,805587 1,805587 
Man.PMI_sw 2,174805 2,481508 2,481508 
Man. PMI_us 1,699964 1,885032 1,885032 
Personal spend._us 1,639963 2,147468 2,147468 
PPI_sw 1,82878 2,274942 2,274942 
Retail sales_sw 1,505603 1,636675 1,636675 
Service PMI_us 1,36251 1,375798 1,375798 
Unemployment_us 1,435622 1,748747 2,065512 
GDPY_sw 1,647414 2,04452 2,04452 
Policy rate_sw 4,127926 4,630743 4,630743 
Policy rate_us 2,662362 3,971265 3,971265 
Import_us 1,834415 2,30102 2,30102 
 
Table 19. Variance Inflation Factor test for model 2 in USDSEK estimation. 
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Table 20. 
Model 1 
GBPSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
Consumer conf._sw 1,290102 1,284204 1,322173 
CPI_sw 1,140465 1,284697 1,256135 
CPI_uk 1,940373 2,035027 2,288099 
GDPY_sw 1,271354 1,345185 1,559595 
GDPY_uk 1,427751 1,574729 1,705968 
Industrial prod._uk 1,586057 2,178274 2,234464 
Man.PMI_sw 1,48583 1,555322 1,99869 
PPI_sw 1,229709 1,265747 1,51843 
Retail sales_sw 1,247706 1,293184 1,776974 
Retail sales_uk 1,660688 1,78448 2,232549 
Service PMI_uk 1,432265 1,431952 1,5858 
Unemployment_sw 1,397823 1,403035 1,172459 
Man.PMI_uk 1,472514 1,475798 1,627033 
Policy rate_sw 1,888805 2,311833 1,867263 
 
Table 20. Variance Inflation Factor test for model 1 in GBPSEK estimation. 
 
Table 21. 
Model 2 
GBPSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
Consumer conf._sw 1,290102 1,284204 1,322173 
CPI_sw 1,140465 1,284697 1,256135 
CPI_uk 1,940373 2,035027 2,288099 
GDPY_sw 1,271354 1,345185 1,559595 
GDPY_uk 1,427751 1,574729 1,705968 
Industrial prod._uk 1,586057 2,178274 2,234464 
Industrial prod._sw 1,236097 1,323996 1,375833 
Man.PMI_sw 1,48583 1,555322 1,99869 
Man.PMI_uk 1,472514 1,475798 1,627033 
PPI_Sw 1,229709 1,265747 1,51843 
Policy rate_sw 1,888805 2,311833 1,867263 
Retail sales_sw 1,247706 1,293184 1,776974 
Retail sales_uk 1,660688 1,78448 2,232549 
Service PMI_uk 1,432265 1,431952 1,5858 
Unemployment_sw 1,397823 1,403035 1,172459 
 
Table 21. Variance Inflation Factor test for model 2 in GBPSEK estimation. 
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Table 22. 
Model 1 
EURSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
Consumer conf._sw 1,220723 1,27841 1,324512 
CPI_sw 1,300678 1,549695 1,611713 
GDPY_sw 1,778231 1,815413 2,139602 
Import_gr 1,579488 1,658139 2,082527 
Industrial prod._sw 1,380337 1,732538 1,787177 
Man.PMI_gr 1,734098 1,816077 1,864874 
Man.PMI_sw 1,785538 1,825327 1,878504 
Policy rate_sw 2,883994 4,323172 3,565545 
Retail sales_sw 1,674432 1,754408 2,28178 
Retail sales_gr 1,395013 1,594585 2,004269 
Unemployment_sw 1,29763 1,33078 1,41379 
Trade_gr 1,571395 1,770758 2,122854 
 
Table 22. Variance Inflation Factor test for model 1 in EURSEK estimation. 
 
Table 23. 
Model 2 
EURSEK Benchmark 2005 2009 
Consumer conf._sw 1,220723 1,27841 1,324512 
CPI_sw 1,300678 1,549695 1,611713 
GDPY_sw 1,778231 1,815413 2,139602 
Import_gr 1,579488 1,732538 2,082527 
Industrial prod._sw 1,38697 1,456524 1,787177 
Man.PMI_gr 1,734098 1,816077 1,864874 
Man.PMI_sw 1,785538 1,825327 1,878504 
Policy rate_sw 2,883994 4,323172 4,116976 
Retail sales_gr 1,395013 1,594585 2,004269 
Retail sales_sw 1,674432 1,754408 2,28178 
Unemplyment_sw 1,29763 1,33078 1,41379 
 
Table 23. Variance Inflation Factor test for model 2 in EURSEK estimation. 
 
 
 
 
